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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
versation, before taking up our work on the briefs. On
these occasions, Judge Sadler was always a genial and entertaining companion, with a keen appreciation of humor,
and I like to think of him from that angle, for thus I came
to know him best.
I am greatly honored by being here today as the representative of the donor of his portrait, which is to adorn the
walls of your Law School, where he both studied and
taught, and of which he was a member of the Board of
Incorporators.
ROBERT von MOSCHZISKER.

INHERITANCE TAXATION OF CONTRACTS TO SELL
FOREIGN REALTY OWNED BY A
RESIDENT DECEDENT
In the recent case of Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330; 154
Att. 503, it is interesting to note the view taken by our
Supreme Court on the question of taxing the land contracts
of a decedent under the inheritance tax laws of Pennsylvania (June 20, 1919, P.L. 521).
The decedent owned two pieces of land, one in New
Jersey, the other in Missouri. Prior to his death he had
executed contracts for the sale of both pieces of land, and
parts of the purchase price had been paid. After his death,
his personal representative received the balance of the purchase price and executed deeds to the purchasers. The
estate was devised wholly to collaterals and the State
claimed a ten per cent tax on the assessed value of the land
contracts.
Beginning with the Act of June 17, 1879, P.L. 112, and
continuing through all subsequent tax legislation, provision
has been made that all articles of agreement for the sale of
land shall be taxable as property of a decedent. No mention was specifically made in any of these statutes, however, as to the location of the land which was the subject
of the contract, whether within or without the state.
There is no express provision in the Transfer Act of 1919,
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concerning the taxing of land contracts, but there is
nothing exempting intangible personal property such as
this owned by the decedent, from taxation under its*provisions.
The majority of the Court, speaking through Justice
Schaffer, reach the conclusion that unpaid purchase money
for real estate situated in other states, evidenced by
articles of agreement executed by a decedent in his lifetime, is not subject to transfer inheritance tax under the
Act of 1919, where the vendor died seised of the lands and,
following payment of the entire purchase money, deeds
therefor were not made until after his death by his personal representative.
The reasons given for the decision were (1) that the
contracts were not choses in action constituting personal
property but were the mere representatives of the land
itself which only the state of its situs could tax; (2) that
taxes should be levied on realities only, and not fictions
such as equitable conversion and "mobilia sequuntur personam"; (3) that the modern tendency is to limit inheritance taxes to the sovereignty which is the situs of the
actual property.
Chief Justice Frazer and Justice Maxey dissented.
There was no doubt in their minds that the land contracts
were just as much taxable personal property as mortgages
and bonds. This conclusion is based on several grounds.
In the first place it is pointed out that as to the land
itself, all that the decedent in Pennsylvania had at the time
of his death was a mere security tftle to the: land, which
is not regarded as of property value, since it is worth
nothing except by way of security, can not be devised or
sold (other than as a contract of indebtedness, with security therefor) as land, and hence could not be taxed in the
states of the situs of the properties. The vendee in the contract has every other interest in the land through the operation of the rule of equitable conversion.
In the second place the dissenting Justices stress the
fact that it is 'settled law in Pennsylvania that a sale of
land on a contract converts the vendor's interest in land
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into personalty, his interest ceases to be an interest in the
land and becomes a chose in action or a solvent credit and
taxable as such.
In the third place, emphasis is placed upon the fact
that all taxing statutes prior to the Act of 1919, beginning
with the Act of June 17, 1879, P.L. 112, and continuing on
through, subjected to state inheritance tax as personal
property all articles of agreement for the sale of land,
without mention of its location, whether within or without the state, and there is nothing in the Act of 1919 tendmg to exempt intangible personal property such as that
in the present case.
It is interesting to note in this connection the change
in the views entertained by the Supreme Court as to the
similar problem of taxing as personalty lands situated in
another state when converted into personalty by a power
of sale given in a testator's will. In the case of Dalrymple's
Estate in 215 Pa. 367, the Court speaking through Justice
Mestrezat said that there was a clear and immediate conversion of the realty situated in North Dakota into personalty and it was therefore subject to the payment of a
collateral inheritance tax, citing Handley's Estate in 181 Pa.

339.
In Commonwealth v. Presbyterian Hospital, 287 Pa. 49,
Justice Simpson, dealing with a situation where a decedent
who was a resident of South Carolina died in Pa., owning real property in Pa., held that an equitable conversion worked by the testator's will would not relieve the
property in Pa. from a transfer inheritance tax as
realty. The Justice also laid down the rule that "where
the tangible property is located in some other state, the
tax can not be imposed by Pa. on the theory of equitable
conversion from realty to personalty." In a short opinion
in Croxton's Estate, 288 Pa. 184, Chief Justice Moschzisker
affirmed without ado the conclusions reached by the
court in the case just discussed. Here the testatrix had
owned real estate in Ohio. The same doctrine has been
asserted also in the cases of Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.

S. 473 and in Robinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 308. The history of

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the decisions in New York is almost -an exact reproduction
of that of the Pennsylvania cases. Since the decision of
the Court of Appeals of New York in Matter of Swift, 137
N. Y. 86, 32 N. E. 1096, it has been settled that where there
is an equitable conversion by will of realty owned by a resident testator in a sister state, such equitable conversion
will not subject the property to a transfer inheritance tax.
The doctrine of this case, which was based on the theory
that taxation is based on facts, and not legal and equitable
fictions, was extended to include an attempted tax on contracts for the sale of land in another state, in the cases of
In re Baker's Estate, 124 N. Y. S. 827 and In re Wolcott's
Estate, 157 N. Y. S. 268.
Pennsylvania, by the decision of its Supreme Court in
Paul's Estate, is apparently following these New York decisions, though the latter two, being lower court cases, are
not mentioned anywhere in the Court's opinion. At the
present time, then, it is safe to say that in Pa. where a
resident testator, prior to his death had owned real property in another state, for which he had executed contracts
of sale, the unpaid purchase price on those contracts at the
time of his death does not constitute personal property
taxable as such. an equitable conversion of the realty to
personalty by the executed contracts not being enough to
give Pa. the right to tax the interests as such.
A search of decided cases fails to reveal any cases
other than the New York cases discussed, which are directly analogous to the case of Paul's Estate.
ROBERT E. KNUPP.

IMPLIED WARRANTY AS BETWEEN
MANUFACTURER AND CONSUMER
There is a considerable conflict in authority as to
whether an action can be maintained directly against a
manufacturer of a defective article for an injury to the
ultimate consumer who purchased from a middleman, and
if so, whether this action should be in trespass for the tort

